Funding rounds, leadership changes, incidents, new capabilities and announcements across the vendors in this catalog — collected automatically from vendors' own public feeds. Product release versions are on their own page, so the landing feed here never reads as one vendor's changelog.Where this comes fromEvery item links to the vendor's own published source: a GitHub release feed, a changelog, a status page, an SEC filing or a company blog. Nothing here is written or editorially reviewed by 0-Doubt, and nothing is a recommendation — it is machine-collected public record, labelled the same way as all other baseline content on the platform. Coverage is uneven by design: a vendor that publishes no public feed will not appear, and that absence is not a judgement about the vendor.
944 matching stories — announcement, in Breach & Attack Simulation / Pen Testing — showing up to 3 per vendorPer-vendor capWhile browsing, no single vendor may fill more than three slots on any one page, so a vendor with a chatty release cadence cannot buy the page you are looking at. That means a page can render fewer stories than the count above. Searching a headline or naming a vendor turns the cap off, because then you have asked to see everything that matches.
Somewhere in your vendor list, right now, there is a door you have never checked. You didn’t build it, you don’t hold the key, and yet if someone walks through it, the breach notification goes out on your letterhead.  The numbers too aren’t subtle. Verizon’s 2026 Data Breach Investigations Report found that 48% of breaches ... Read more
Before you sign with a penetration testing vendor, ask precise questions that turn marketing claims into measurable commitments. Confirm exact scope, learn which work is automated, AI-led, or human-led, and require that findings get reproduced and validated before they reach a report. Ask who can access your environment, how testers are vetted, and what the rules of engagement and stop conditions look like. Review sample reports, confirm remediation and retesting terms, and normalize every cost.
If your scan engine already holds credentials for a host, it can ask that host which ports are open instead of probing for them.Every scan begins with the same question: which ports on this host are open? Everything after it, from identifying services to checking for vulnerabilities to evaluating policy, depends on the answer being right. The traditional answer comes from the outside: the scan engine sends traffic to a range of ports and infers each port's state from how the host responds. That
TL;DR Introduction Default printer configurations are common to find in internal infrastructure engagements. These configurations are usually insecure, exposing outdated protocols like SNMPv1 and web interfaces without requiring authentication. For an unauthenticated, internal attacker, this can be a treasure trove of information for later exploitation, sometimes including usernames, email addresses and file names: However, the […] The post Passing the bucks $$$: Passback attacks explained
September 2026 in GenAI security: OWASP's LLM Top 10 rebuilt on 6,639 real incidents, stolen reasoning traces, and ten flaws in the local inference engine.
CRPx0 is a cybercrime operation that started off operating a scam before pivoting into a fully-blown ransomware and cryptocurrency business. Read more in my article on the Fortra blog.
Adobe disclosed CVE-2026-7565, dubbed “StyleSmuggler,” on September 7th, 2026. The vulnerability, which received a maximal initial CVSS score of 10.0, affects Adobe Commerce, Adobe Commerce B2B, and Magento Open Source. The flaw allows an unauthenticated network-based attacker to execute arbitrary code by injecting PHP through Magento's email template engine. The post “StyleSmuggler” – Adobe Commerce, Adobe Commerce B2B, and Magento RCE (CVE-2026-75650): Overview and Takeaways appeared fir
A hands-on workflow for running pentests with Claude Code or Codex, validating real vulnerabilities, and sending confirmed findings directly to Faraday. The post Hands-On: Claude/Codex Pentest → Faraday appeared first on Faraday.
Jason Haddix on why manual pentesting can't keep up, what disappears first, and why human methodology is what makes AI pentesting work Category: Guides & Best Practices
AI agents are being given more responsibility inside business environments. They can interact with applications, access data, call APIs, use tools, and complete multistep tasks with limited human involvement. Every additional capability creates another decision an organization must make about what the agent should be allowed to do. Recent research shows why those decisions need […] The post Your AI Agent Knows the Rules. That Doesn’t Mean It Will Follow Them appeared first on Carson
Skyhawk Security has been named a Sample Vendor in Gartner® research, Emerging Tech: AI Vendor Race — Avoid the Intelligent Simulation Tech Trap With Targeted Business Outcomes. The company offers Intelligent Simulation capabilities, the technology at the heart of our mission to help organizations prevent cloud breaches. The problem: a clean dashboard is not a […] The post Skyhawk Security mentioned in Gartner® Research: Emerging Tech: AI Vendor Race — Avoid the Intelligent Simulation Tech
We detected XCSSET malware inside a compromised Flutter package on pub.dev. Here is a full breakdown of the infection chain, propagation modules, and stealer logic we found inside. Category: Vulnerabilities & Threats
How we broke the default sandboxes in Claude Code, Gemini CLI, and Codex — leaking credentials from all three, including a CVSS 10.0 chain. DefCon 2026 research. The post DefCon 2026: The Sandbox Is a Suggestion: Breaking Claude Code, Gemini CLI, and Codex Sandboxes appeared first on Novee.
How a CVSS 10.0 pre-task RCE in Google Gemini CLI ran attacker code before the sandbox started. No prompt injection required. Full DefCon 2026 research. The post DefCon 2026: No Prompt Required: Pre-Task RCE in Google Gemini CLI appeared first on Novee.
Enterprise applications often connect multiple systems, user roles, APIs, cloud services, databases, and third-party platforms. This complexity can create security weaknesses that may not be identified through basic vulnerability scanning alone. In this blog, we cover 15 critical issues that security teams commonly assess during enterprise VAPT, along with why these vulnerabilities matter and where they can […]
Vendor demos for AI governance platforms all sound alike—the differences only surface under questions that can't be answered with a yes. Ten questions that test discovery, runtime evidence, explainability, enforcement, and what year two actually costs.
Many healthcare organizations have been told that HIPAA requires an annual penetration test. The current rule is more nuanced. Penetration testing for HIPAA compliance is not prescribed as one universal annual obligation, but regulated entities must conduct a comprehensive risk analysis, manage identified risks, and evaluate whether their safeguards remain effective. A well-scoped pentest can provide important evidence supporting those responsibilities. HHS has also proposed making annual penetr
A 2026 Gartner® Peer Insights™ Customers’ Choice for Adversarial Exposure Validation Picus is a Customer's Choice in the 2026 Gartner® Peer Insights™ Voice of the Customer for Adversarial Exposure Validation (AEV). 98% of reviewers would recommend Picus, the highest overall ratings amongst Customers' Choice vendors in the report. Read the full report to see how security teams rate the all-in-one platform built for AEV.
Sable ignored every prompt canary in our tests. Realistic decoy accounts proved more effective when easy attack paths disappeared. Here’s what the results mean for defenders building detection for AI-driven attacks.
The core components required to move from automated discovery to proven risk now exist: capable models, controlled execution, scalable orchestration, evidence capture and human judgement. The opportunity is to engineer them as one dependable system rather than treat each as a standalone feature. The post AI Can Find Vulnerabilities. Building a System That Proves Risk Is the Hard Part. appeared first on Synack.
Sep 07, 2026 - Jeremy Snyder - Recently, I had the opportunity to speak on the main stage at the combined API:World, AI TechWorld and CloudX event in Santa Clara. I wanted to share my thoughts on what I presented, as well as the slides (linked below). As always, if you have any questions for me or the FireTail team, just reach out!APIs Are the Attack Surface That Matters in AI-Powered AppsFive breaches. Five different vendors, most of them with security teams bigger than my entire company. Zero
As SaaS companies grow, they add new features, APIs, integrations, cloud services, and user workflows. Each change can introduce new security risks, making the timing of VAPT an important part of an ongoing security program.  In this blog, we explain how often growing SaaS companies should perform VAPT testing, which changes should trigger an additional assessment, and […]
A known Shai-Hulud worm payload sat dormant for 111 days, then republished to npm, right past the malware scanning meant to catch it. Category: Vulnerabilities & Threats
Summary of a closed-door CISO roundtable, hosted by CISO Platform with FireCompass, August 2026. Held under Chatham House convention. Senior security leaders spent a session on three questions. What does it cost to run an AI pentesting agent at full speed? What has to be true architecturally before you point one at production. And what… Read More »Implementing Agentic AI Pentesting While Managing Risk and Cost The post Implementing Agentic AI Pentesting While Managing Risk and Co
Some of the most dangerous vulnerabilities in modern web apps are the default features left switched on where they were never meant to be reachable. The first entry in our Findings from the AP series looks at an exposed actuator endpoint. On paper, this finding started the same way most do: an HTTP endpoint returned ... Read more
September 2026 MCP security roundup: the Deadbugz supply chain campaign hides its payload until the third tool call, plus three new MCP server CVEs.
PASC (Physical AI Safety Consortium), launched by AIM Intelligence, is an open global consortium focused on building the foundations for safe and governable Physical AI. Bringing together researchers, industry, and safety institutions, PASC develops shared definitions, benchmarks, and evaluation methods to address the unique risks of AI systems that can sense, decide, and act in the physical world.
Remix's Single Fetch feature introduces a routing discrepancy that lets attackers bypass auth checks via .data requests. Here's how it works and how to fix it.
AI is accelerating vulnerability discovery, but security teams still need to know which exposures actually matter. Here’s what Fal.Con 2026 reinforced about offensive security, validation, and proving risk.
OverviewA new Linux toolkit, identified by Rapid7 Labs, has been targeting organizations across South Korea’s automotive and media industries with minimal detection. The campaign made use of a HAProxy instance named “ted backdoor”, alongside trojanized versions of crond, agetty, atd, sshd, and polkitd. This previously undocumented framework enabled threat actors to execute remote commands on compromised servers, inject malicious scripts into web traffic, perform credential harvesting, and engage
Compare the 7 best AI penetration testing tools of 2026. See which platforms prove exploits, reason like attackers, and run continuous testing at scale. The post 7 Best AI Penetration Testing Tools of 2026 appeared first on Novee.
Theoretical vulnerability criticality does not matter. Here is one attack chain our AI agents ran that explains why. A Fortune 1000 organization put one public-facing back-office application in scope, in the tier that handles payouts and ledgers. Tested on its own, that application returned a short list of medium-severity findings. FireCompass agents also tested the… Read More »Case Study: Attack Chaining from an External Web Application to an Internal Network Foothold The post C
37 agentic AI security resources from August 2026: 19 unauthorized agent actions in a government eval, OpenAI's rogue swarm, and memory poisoning filters miss.
CTEM is the workflow. BAS simulates against your controls. AEV proves against your reality. Read on for the honest comparison and how to build the right validation layer.
See how Virginia Tech used the NodeZero GraphQL API, GitLab, and ServiceNow to automate external pentesting and create a repeatable workflow from attack validation to remediation.
An Empirical 8-Model Benchmark on Agent Harness Architecture, Model Over-Refusal, Token Efficiency, and Enterprise Sovereignty in Modern AI-Driven Penetration Testing 1. The Core Thesis: Offensive Capability Is a Function of […] The post The Harness Advantage in Autonomous Red Teaming: Why Frontier LLMs Alone Fail Offensive Security and How RidgeGen Solves the Alignment Dilemma appeared first on Ridge Security.
Azure has been growing rapidly over the past few years As of June 2026, there were over 200 services, 897 built-in Azure RBAC roles, and 22,018 different permissions. The attack surface of Azure has also increased with this growth. There are also a number of new and updated tools that give us insight into the The post Modern Adventures in Azure Privilege Escalation appeared first on NetSPI.
A low-cost VAPT assessment may appear attractive, but a limited security test can leave important vulnerabilities undiscovered. If critical issues are found later, organizations may face additional testing, remediation expenses, release delays, or security incidents.  In this blog, we explain what a quality VAPT should cover, why manual testing matters, the hidden costs of choosing a provider […]