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1 of 5 independent trust signals established
Omada has one dimension with established evidence. The rest have not been confirmed yet.
Not yet established: Independently verified · Operating durability · Disclosure posture · Momentum
Has anyone other than the vendor confirmed this?
Nothing here has been confirmed by an independent third party yet.
Is this a real, durable business?
How long this vendor has been operating, and who stands behind them.
What do they do when something goes wrong?
What their public record shows about handling vulnerabilities and outages.
Do they tell you the awkward things unprompted?
How much this vendor volunteers before you have to ask.
Not a quality rating or endorsement — a measure of how much verified, disclosed data we actually have about this vendor. A low score usually means "we don't have much verified information yet," not "this is a bad vendor." Never used to sort or rank vendor lists.
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Cloud-based IGA solution for identity lifecycle mgmt and access governance AI-generated from public sourcesThe starting point for every profile: auto-generated by 0-Doubt from public vendor materials, and not yet confirmed by the vendor or an independent analyst. Nothing here is hidden or overstated — it simply has not been reviewed yet.Where every profile starts, before the vendor or an analyst has reviewed it. A higher label means a more independent source — not a better product.How trust works →
Security headers (4/5) — checked 8/14/2026
Infrastructure & transparency signals
A vulnerability exists in the Dynamic DNS (DDNS) functionality of TP-Link Omada Gateways. During communication with a third-party DDNS service, authentication credentials are transmitted over an unenc…
A pre-authentication OS command injection vulnerability has been identified in Omada gateways configured to operate as an OpenVPN Server due to insufficient validation of client-supplied data during O…
A cryptographic weakness exists in affected Omada devices where site credentials are protected using a legacy hashing algorithm that does not provide sufficient protection. An attacker who ob…
Datasheets, whitepapers, and case studies found on omadaidentity.com by the enrichment loop. Links open the original documents on the vendor's own site.
Product information on this page is auto-generated by 0-Doubt from public sources and not yet confirmed by the vendor or an independent analyst, unless an item is individually labelled otherwise. How trust works →
Are they still shipping, or coasting?
Whether this vendor is visibly still building.
A race condition exists in the cloud-based Omada device adoption process when an attacker may be able to interact with the adoption workflow before a legitimate device completes registration, resultin…
A cryptographic weakness exists in the Omada adoption protocol where session encryption keys used to protect communications between controllers and managed devices may be predictable due to insufficie…
Affected Omada devices rely on embedded certificates that are shared across deployments to establish trust between controllers and managed devices. An attacker who obtains the embedded certif…
A cryptographic weakness exists in the Omada adoption protocol. The protocol relies on hard-coded cryptographic keys to establish trust and protect authentication exchanges between controllers and ma…
A cryptographic weakness exists in the Omada device adoption process. During adoption, authentication credentials associated with site management are transmitted using a weak hashing algorithm that d…
A certification validation weakness exists in communication between affected Omada devices and cloud controllers. Certificate identity verification does not adequately validate that a presented certif…
The web interface on multiple Omada switches does not adequately validate certain external inputs, which may lead to out-of-bound memory access when processing crafted requests. Under specific condit…
A denial-of-service (DoS) vulnerability was identified in Omada EAP610 v3. An attacker with adjacent network access can send crafted requests to cause the device’s HTTP service to crash. This result…
A permissive web security configuration may allow cross-origin restrictions enforced by modern browsers to be bypassed under specific circumstances. Exploitation requires the presence of an existing …
Blind Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in Omada Controllers through webhook functionality, enabling crafted requests to internal services, which may lead to enumeration of information.
Password Confirmation Bypass vulnerability in Omada Controllers, allowing an attacker with a valid session token to bypass secondary verification, and change the user’s password without proper confirm…
An IDOR vulnerability exists in Omada Controllers that allows an attacker with Administrator permissions to manipulate requests and potentially hijack the Owner account.
An authentication weakness was identified in Omada Controllers, Gateways and Access Points, controller-device adoption due to improper handling of random values. Exploitation requires advanced network…
A Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability was identified in a parameter in Omada Controllers due to improper input sanitization. Exploitation requires advanced conditions, such as network positioning…
An attacker may obtain the root shell on the underlying OS system with the restricted conditions on Omada gateways.
A command injection vulnerability may be exploited after the admin's authentication on the web portal on Omada gateways.
Stored Cross-Site Scripting in the Access Request History in Omada Identity before version 15 update 1 allows an authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code in the browser of a victim via a speci…