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Start from a neutral baseline and add what matters to you. Criteria are labeled by source — the platform baseline is architecture-neutral; buyer-contributed criteria are shown separately.
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Ask specifically about evasion-resistant sandboxing (human-interaction simulation, extended detonation windows) and insist on a measured rate against known-evasive samples, not just a generic malware test set that evasive malware would simply ignore.
Inline blocking requires a fast verdict; look for a stated typical detonation-to-verdict time and whether the vendor is honest that thorough sandboxing sometimes can't keep pace with inline blocking, requiring a hybrid fast-prefilter-plus-sandbox architecture.
Strong answers give a per-type breakdown of static analysis versus full detonation; static-only analysis for some types is a real coverage gap that should be disclosed, not glossed over.
Malware increasingly targets specific OS/app version combinations; a sandbox that only tests one generic environment can miss malware built to evade or target a different configuration than the customer actually runs.
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Verified buyers can suggest criteria (anonymized before pooling).
Automatic verdict propagation to enforcement points closes the loop from detection to protection; manual-only propagation leaves a window where the same threat can reach other users before the finding is acted on.
A vendor unable to state an approximate false-positive rate likely hasn't measured production accuracy; verify override decisions actually persist and don't require re-litigating the same false positive repeatedly.
Cloud sandboxing raises real data-confidentiality questions for sensitive attachments; ask what on-prem or private-cloud options exist for regulated customers who can't send files to a shared multi-tenant cloud sandbox.
Password-protected archives are a well-known evasion technique; a sandbox with no capability to detonate them has a real, exploitable coverage gap the vendor should acknowledge rather than ignore.
Look for pricing that doesn't penalize exactly the scenario where the tool is most valuable (a real incident requiring mass file analysis) — a per-file model with no burst accommodation creates a perverse cost spike during a crisis.
A sandbox verdict indicating an active campaign deserves IR-severity escalation, not routine detonation-report handling — ask for a specific fast-track mechanism and a real customer example.
Trend-over-time reporting is a distinct capability from a per-sample verdict — confirm this exists as a maintained, exportable report.
Automated IOC sharing into the broader threat-intel ecosystem is materially more valuable than manual export requiring analyst effort for every detonation.
Submitted files often contain sensitive business content in addition to the malicious payload — role-based access control over sample storage is an often-overlooked consideration.
Look for explicit tenant isolation guarantees, especially around sample-sharing/deduplication logic that could otherwise leak information about which other customers submitted the same sample.
Ask for a specific incident-scale throughput figure, not just a routine daily-volume claim — sandbox capacity during exactly the high-stakes moment it's needed most is the real test.
A vendor should give a specific answer on regional processing or on-prem deployment options; a cloud-only sandbox with no data-residency control is a real gap for regulated customers handling sensitive files.