Question 1

What file types does the platform sanitize (Office documents, PDFs, images, archives) and does sanitization preserve document usability/formatting fidelity, or does the reconstructed file frequently break formatting or lose legitimate active content (macros, embedded objects) users actually need?

Accepted Answer

A CDR product that reliably breaks legitimate document formatting or strips content users need drives real user friction and workarounds; ask for a fidelity-preservation figure or a live demonstration on realistic complex documents, not simple test files.

Question 2

Describe the sanitization approach — does it rebuild files from a known-safe structure (true CDR) or merely scan-and-strip suspicious elements from the original file (a hybrid approach with residual risk) — and what is the vendor's position on zero-day exploit protection versus signature/pattern-based sanitization.

Accepted Answer

True structural rebuild-from-safe-parts CDR provides protection against unknown/zero-day exploits by design, since it doesn't rely on recognizing malicious patterns; a scan-and-strip hybrid has more residual risk against novel techniques — ask the vendor to be specific about which model they implement.

Question 3

What is the processing latency added to file delivery (email attachment, file upload, download) under realistic production volume, and does this create a noticeable delay for end users receiving time-sensitive files?

Accepted Answer

CDR reconstruction is computationally more intensive than simple malware scanning; ask for a measured latency figure under production load, not a lab benchmark, since added delay is a common real-world adoption friction point.

Question 4

How does the platform handle files where legitimate active content (macros in a finance team's Excel workflow, for example) is a genuine business requirement — is there a policy exception mechanism, or does CDR uniformly strip active content regardless of business need?

Accepted Answer

A policy-based exception mechanism for specific verified business workflows is more practical than a uniform strip-everything approach that breaks legitimate use cases and drives shadow-IT workarounds.

Question 5

Detail deployment points — email gateway, web/file upload, removable media, or all three — and whether coverage is consistent across every ingestion point in the customer's environment or concentrated on just one channel (commonly email) leaving other channels unprotected.

Accepted Answer

Attackers will use whichever channel isn't protected; ask for an explicit per-channel coverage breakdown rather than assuming uniform protection because 'CDR' is in the product name.

Question 6

What visibility and reporting exists for what was actually removed/modified during sanitization — can a security team or the recipient see exactly what active content was stripped from a given file, or is sanitization a silent black-box process?

Accepted Answer

Transparent reporting on what was stripped helps both security teams tune policy and end users understand why a file looks different, rather than a silent, unexplained transformation that erodes user trust in the tool.

Question 7

What is the pricing model — per user, per file volume, or a flat enterprise tier — and how does cost scale as file-transfer volume grows significantly across the organization?

Accepted Answer

Look for transparent, predictable scaling economics tied to realistic file-volume growth, not just a per-file price that becomes unpredictable at scale.

Question 8

When sanitization strips content from a file that turns out to have been a genuine, sophisticated exploit attempt (not just routine active-content stripping), does that event feed into broader incident-response/threat-intelligence workflows, or does it remain an isolated, unreported sanitization log entry?

Accepted Answer

A CDR block of a real targeted exploit attempt is meaningful threat-intelligence signal — ask whether this is surfaced to the security team as a genuine incident, not just silently logged as routine sanitization.

Question 9

Detail historical trend reporting on sanitization volume and the proportion of files containing genuinely suspicious active content over time, suitable for demonstrating threat exposure to leadership.

Accepted Answer

Trend-over-time reporting is a distinct capability from per-file sanitization logs — confirm this exists as a maintained, exportable report.

Question 10

How does the platform integrate with the customer's existing email-security and malware-analysis stack — is CDR a genuinely complementary layer, or does deployment require a separate, disconnected management console from the rest of the email-security pipeline?

Accepted Answer

Look for genuine integration into the existing email-security workflow; a standalone CDR console disconnected from the broader stack creates real operational complexity.

Question 11

What is the vendor's honest disclosure of any known file types or techniques that can evade sanitization, and what testing has been done to measure evasion resistance rather than only advertising the technique's theoretical zero-day-proof design?

Accepted Answer

Even true rebuild-based CDR can have edge-case gaps — a vendor willing to discuss known limitations is more credible than one claiming absolute protection with no caveats.

Question 12

What compliance-evidence generation exists showing sanitization was active and applied to all relevant file traffic (for a secure-email-gateway audit requirement), and is this a built-in exportable report or something the security team must assemble manually?

Accepted Answer

Native compliance-evidence generation is materially more valuable than raw sanitization logs requiring manual compilation for every audit cycle.

Question 13

How consistent is sanitization coverage and processing latency across multi-cloud/hybrid deployment (on-prem gateway, cloud email provider integration, web upload) — is depth equally mature across every ingestion point, or meaningfully shallower for one?

Accepted Answer

Ask for an honest per-deployment-point coverage breakdown; uneven coverage across ingestion channels is a common real gap a vendor should disclose rather than obscure.

Question 14

What API/developer integration exists for embedding CDR into custom file-upload pipelines or internal applications, beyond the standard email-gateway/web-upload deployment points?

Accepted Answer

A real, documented API is materially more useful for a team wanting to build sanitization into their own custom workflows than being limited to pre-built deployment points.

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